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ABSTRACT 
The main focus of this study is to evaluate whether load following operation can be 
performed using the existing South African nuclear power plant. Of which, knowing that 
will assist in determining whether the addition of load following capabilities on the 
planned nuclear fleet is justifiable or not. In this report the relevance of Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Plant to adapt to the demand is examined and the effects on plant operation 
simulated. The report analyses the operation of the existing nuclear power plant (Koeberg 
units) in South Africa and describes the regulations that govern safe operation of the 
plant. The Koeberg plant is analyzed based on the current design i.e. operating as a base-
load station. This allows a prediction of the Koeberg plant response to big load variations. 
The simulation results of the load variation are analyzed and the results used to make the 
conclusion that the Koeberg units are not capable of load following safely. Modifying the 
Koeberg units from being base load station to load following will require changing the 
Safety Analysis Report and therefore affect the Koeberg license NIL-01. 
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Glossary of Nuclear Power Plant Terms 
This section defines some of the terms that are used frequently in this report and are 
specific to the nuclear power generation industry. 
Burnup: The energy produced by the fuel expressed in megawatt days per metric ton of 
uranium (MWD/MTU). 
End of Life (EOL): Period during nuclear fission when there is not enough excess 
reactivity in the core to maintain the reactor at full power and nominal temperature. 
Extended Low Power Operation (ELPO): Continuous operation below 87%Pn for a period of 
greater than 12 hours per 24 hours of power operation. 
House Loading: The action whereby the Nuclear Power Plant automatically disconnects its 
turbine from the national electrical grid and only supplies its own auxiliaries. 
Linear Power Density: Power generation per unit length of fuel element, measured in 
W/cm. 
Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS): The reactor and the reactor coolant pumps, the steam 
generators and associated piping in a nuclear power plant used to generate the steam needed to 
drive the turbine generator unit.  
Pellet Clad Interaction (PCI): The mechanical contact between the fuel pellets and the 
Zirconium-alloy cladding.  
Safety Control Rod Axe Man (SCRAM): Manual or automatic reactor trip 






 CHAPTER 1: Introduction   
1.1 Background 
In South Africa, nuclear power plants (NPPs) were introduced into the electrical production 
sector in 1984 & 1985 as base load sources of electricity (Eskom, 2014). With the change in 
electricity demand and usage patterns, there is a growing need for NPPs to follow the load 
demand. The capability of the NPPs to follow load is more prevalent in countries that rely on 
nuclear power and in countries which are increasing the renewable energy share in their energy 
mix.  
 
In this report, the term “Load following” and “Flexible Operation” will be used interchangeably 
to cover operations such as:  
 Abrupt Load Change Operation – Load rejection at any power level, turbine trip without 
reactor trip, turbine generator runback to house load.   
 Daily Load Following Operation – a typical daily cycle is 100-50-100 (percent power) in 
a 14-2-6-2(hr) pattern. 
 
 Frequency Control Operation:  
 About 2.5% power changes without control rod movement, for local frequency 
control. 
 About 5% power changes with control rod movement for grid frequency changes. 
 
 Extended Low Power Operation – operating the reactor at reduced power due to low 
electricity demand i.e. operating the reactor below 87% power for a period of greater than 
12 hours per 24 hours of power operation. This could be caused by change of season or a 
change in the region’s energy mix i.e. increased input from renewables or reduced 
demand.  
The existing rules and regulation in SA do not support load following since such an option was 
omitted during the designing, specification and licensing of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant 
(KNPP). At the time, it was not envisaged that KNPP would require load following capabilities 
because its purpose was to provide grid stability in the Western Cape since the fossil-fuel power 
stations were too expensive with too many challenges to be viable in Western Cape. At the time, 
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the costs to include load following capabilities could not be justified. Therefore the daily load 
cycling of NPPs was not permitted by the National Nuclear Regular (NNR), although the 
Koeberg design can accommodate infrequent load transients caused by disturbances in the 
national grid. 
1.2 Current condition of the South African energy sector 
 
According to IRP2010, South Africa is planning to increase the nuclear share in the energy mix to 
23% and also introduce a significant amount (43%) of renewable energy into the energy mix 
(DoE, 2010). This is perfectly in line with the world’s developments in the energy sector, as 
indicated in the International Energy Agency in Figure 1 below (IAE, 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Global installed power generation capacity and additions by technology in the New Policies 
Scenario 
Although coal remains dominant as a source of electricity generation, a national and international 
policy shift towards low carbon technologies is evident. The global projections are that the shift 
to nuclear, renewables and other low-carbon technologies will reduce the amount of CO2 
emissions considerably. The South African government committed to reduce the country’s 
3: 
~ 
Figure 5.11: Global installed power generation capacity and additions 







2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
- Total installed capacity 







Renewables and nuclear power account for more than half 
of all the new capacity added worldwide through to 2035 
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emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2050 (IAE, 2010). The adoption of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, is another 
platform to encourage the use of low-carbon technologies by using legally binding agreements. 
The purpose of the agreement is to enhance action prior to 2020 by implementing possible 
mitigation efforts as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol1 (COP21, 2015). 
The Department of Energy is in a process of publishing the updated Integrated Resource Plan 
which will create a policy certainty in the energy space. This will clarify South African 
government’s position on nuclear fleet expansion. 
1.3 South Africa’s Nuclear Build Programme 
South Africa is preparing to undertake a possible nuclear plant building project to add 6900 MW 
of nuclear energy into the energy mix (Government, 2016). With the overnight capital cost in 
2015 estimated between $2021/kWe in Korea and $6215/kWe in Hungary, a large capital 
investment will be required (WNA, 2016). This initiative comes at a time where neither the SA 
government nor Eskom utility is in a sound financial position to fund such a project. Cost 
minimisation therefore should be one of the main priorities of the South African nuclear build 
programme. 
 
At the moment, in SA, there are two Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) operating as base load 
stations i.e. the two Koeberg operating units, each producing ~970MWe2. These reactors were not 
designed to respond to changes in load demand, their design purpose was to stabilise the grid and 
therefore required as base load units3. The decision for the Koeberg units to operate as base load 
stations was based on the fact that their total output capacity in the grid was a small percentage 
(<10%) of the total generating capacity, and significantly less than the grid’s minimum demand. 
This meant that the Koeberg units could be operated at full power while the National Grid 
Controller uses the coal fired power stations to balance the generation with demand and maintain 
grid frequency. 
                                                 
 
1The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty, which extends the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that commits State Parties to reduce greenhouse gases 
emissions, based on the premise that (a) global warming exists and (b) man-made CO2 emissions have 
caused it. 
2Each unit uses ~40 MWe for its own power supplies i.e. ~ 930 MWe is sent out to the grid. 




With SA planning to build more Nuclear Power Plants while increasing the renewables in the 
energy mix, the question of load following arises. It becomes necessary to interrogate the 
capability of the NPPs to respond to load changes whether daily, seasonally or to respond to 
unforeseen grid disturbances. The load changes could be due to a loss of a power generating 
unit or units, which could change the grid by anything from 100MW – 1000MW. Certain 
European countries, like France and Belgium, use the “10% Rule”4 to reduce the output of 
large reactors at times of low demand (OECD, 2011). 
1.4 Load variation challenge to South African NPPs 
At the moment, when a big loss (>5%) in generation capacity occurs in the South African grid, 
the national electric grid controller must correct the nominal 50 Hz grid frequency before it 
decreases to less than 47.5 Hz, otherwise both Koeberg reactors will house load5. This is 
undesirable because each of the two Koeberg units generates about 970 MW. This means that the 
turbine has to automatically runback from 970 MW to 40 MW at a rate of about 500 MW/minute. 
This requires the control rods to insert into the core at maximum speed (72 steps per minute) from 
~220 rod steps in order to suppress the nuclear reaction and therefore reduce the heat input into 
the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The rapid insertion of control rods occurs simultaneously 
with the turbine bypass system operating to remove heat from the RCS, therefore cooling the 
core. This is undesirable because it reduces the shutdown margin and puts strain on major 
equipment like control rods drive mechanism (CRDM). 
 
There are also morning and evening electricity demand peaks that could occur over a few hours 
and the generating units need to respond to that demand. One of the main challenges to NPPs 
manoeuvrability is the xenon production and removal from the core. An increase or decrease in 
reactor power has a direct effect on xenon production and removal, and xenon oscillation can take 
several hours before reaching equilibrium. Xenon oscillation therefore directly challenges reactor 
safety by changing the reactivity and the power density of the core. The reactivity change can be 
positive or negative, depending on the direction of the power change and core life. 
                                                 
 
4 This philosophy is based on the fact that it is difficult to control the fall in frequency after a reactor trip if 
it generates about 10% or more of system demand at the time. 
5 House Loading – is when the NPP automatically disconnects its turbine from the national grid and only 




The focus of this dissertation is on technical aspects to consider when a NPP is operated in load 
following mode, paying special attention to effects on the integrity of the RCS boundary and fuel 
performance i.e. RCS pressure & temperature spikes, reactor coolant levels, axial offset, 
shutdown margin and xenon effects.  
 
1.5 Key questions to be answered in this dissertation 
What is load following and why is it necessary i.e. benefits? 
What are the disadvantages of load following using nuclear plants? 
What challenges would the current Gen II NPPs encounter if they were to operate in load 
following mode?  
1.6 Objective of this dissertation 
To examine whether load following is possible for the existing South African NPPs, and whether 
it is necessary for the future NPPs to load follow.  
Note: The generation III reactor designs (EPR, VVER, AP1000 & APR) include advanced rod 
control system in their designs, and the manufacturers guarantee that the reactors are capable of 
step changes of up to 20% of nominal power. This is achievable because their control rod system 
design has been modified to include an Advanced Rod Cluster Control assembly (ARCC) which 
is more robust and consists of both black and grey rods. Black rods are made of material with a 
good absorption cross section for thermal neutrons and do not rapidly saturate e.g. 80% silver, 
15% cadmium, 5% indium. Therefore black rods absorb all incident thermal neutrons while grey 
rods only absorb a portion of thermal neutrons. The ARCC is designed to manage xenon 
oscillation during load following without the use of soluble chemical neutron absorber (boric 
acid/chemical shim) in the reactor coolant and therefore maintain an evenly distributed flux. 
This report will also:  
 Examine the technical difficulty, complexity of operation and safety of NPPs during 
significant load variations. 
 Determine the necessity for the SA’s NPPs to follow load. 
 Obtain an understanding of nuclear plant load following technique. 
 Evaluate how load following affects nuclear safety. 
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 Simulate the behaviour of a NPP when responding to load changes and determine 
possible effects on the core. (Subject to Koeberg simulator availability). 
 Formulate an opinion on whether SA should modify the current NPPs to follow load and 
or include the load following function in its future nuclear plant designs. 
1.7 Research methodology and approach 
The research will comprise of five main activities namely:  
 Literature review on nuclear power plant’s load following, including defects and 
equipment failures associated with load following. 
 Demonstration of Koeberg units’ load change capability using the Koeberg plant 
simulator i.e. simulate a house loading event or an islanding event. 
 Analysis of the data collected during simulation or use test results from other researches 
if Koeberg simulator is not available. 
 Conclusions and possible further work required. 
1.8 Motivation and implication of research 
There is a need for academics, engineers, scientists and specialists to get involved in South 
Africa’s nuclear program to advise, support or educate the stakeholders involved in this project 
including the decision makers. The nuclear deal should be specific to the South African energy 
mix requirements and unnecessary features in the design should be eliminated to minimise costs 
while maintaining nuclear safety as one of the high priorities. The findings of this research could 
be used when choosing the appropriate technology suitable for South African grid conditions and 
could also be used to highlight areas where capital costs could be reduced. 
1.9 Research outputs 
 The research will produce a detailed reasoning of whether load following should be 
considered or not in SA. 
 The pros and cons of load following with NPPs. 
 The current design’s capability to accommodate big load changes. 
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1.10  Koeberg Simulator model 
Model used: Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) of inverted U-tube steam generators, 3 loop 
Framatome plant (MST, 2006). 
The simulator model is run on Orchird® software suite created by L3-MAPPS. It is capable of 
simulating a variety of accident and transient conditions that could occur in a nuclear power plant. 
The simulation ranges from sensor failures and equipment failures to grid disturbances and cold 
leg double-ended guillotine break. The software operates in the Windows XP environment at a 
speed faster than real-time. The speed of simulation can be adjusted to 16 times faster than real-
time. The status of important parameters and equipment is displayed in a high-resolution colour 
mimic and colour coded control panels. The software allows simulation of operator actions by 
means of interactive controls. The Koeberg model consists of the main process areas found in a 
NPP, including all control & safety systems. Therefore the simulator reflects the behavior of a 
real NPP.  
The software package consists of a set of initial conditions that represent different plant 
conditions e.g. time of life and power level. Auto / manual modes of plant operation are 
selectable using the mouse. All the possible incidents and accidents analysed in the Koeberg 
Safety Analysis Report (KSAR) can be simulated using the software. This is normally performed 
for training, investigation or design purposes. Incidents and accidents that can be simulated 
include: 
 Full power plant operation 
 Start-up, shutdown and power changes 
 Turbine trip with or without bypass available 
 Reactor trip with all control rods inserted or Anticipated transient without scram 
(ATWS) 
 Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) 
 Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break accident  
 Dilution or boration transients 
 House load or islanding 
 Loss of off-site power 
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 Feed water transients 
 Steam line break 
 Any combination of the above 
Initial conditions can be selected from a variety of set initial conditions corresponding to various 
power levels and time of life conditions of the plant. This version is also used by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a training platform for its simulation workshops. It is a 
practical tool used in licensed operator training, instructor training, emergency exercises, 




CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Basic layout of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plant 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustrates the basic layout of a PWR, showing only the major components 
. (Eskom, 2014) 
2.1.1 Reactor 
The reactor vessel volume is designed taking into account the equipment contained: core, control 
rod clusters, internal core support structures and other parts directly associated with the core. The 
core is the heart of the nuclear power plant, where the nuclear fission takes place. Heat is 
generated in the core through the fission process in the fuel rods and the energy produced is 
removed by the reactor coolant i.e. in a light water reactor, moderation is by elastic scattering of 
neutrons by protons. The reactor coolant enters the reactor vessel through the vessel inlet nozzles, 
flows down into the annulus formed by the vessel and the core barrel, rises into the core and the 
outlet plenum and leaves the vessel through the vessel outlet nozzles.  
 
CondenlOfe Pump 
T• rtlolY loop 




In PWRs, the coolant also acts as a neutron moderator. The coolant is force-circulated by the 
reactor coolant pumps and is maintained sub-cooled by the reactor coolant system pressure. The 
system operates at 15.5 MPa pressure and the average reactor coolant system temperature is 
maintained at 296 °C i.e. ~20 °C sub-cooling margin (Eskom, 2007). The coolant consists of 
borated water for excess reactivity control.  
2.1.2 Pressurizer (PRZ) 
The pressuriser is designed to maintain the RCS pressure in a range compatible with the safety 
and availability requirements of the reactor. It maintains the RCS pressure at 15.5 MPa in order to 
maintain sub-cooling6 in the primary loop. The purpose of the pressurizer is to: 
 Act as a surge tank for the part of the main reactor coolant system which is 
constituted by the vessel, the reactor coolant pump casings, the tubes and 
plenums of the steam generators and the reactor coolant piping that connects 
them. 
 Control the pressure owing to the presence of saturated liquid in equilibrium with 
its steam and of control devices such as heaters, spray in the steam phase and 
steam relief valves. 
 Protects the plant against overpressures by providing a sufficient quality of steam 
phase and steam relief valves. 
In steady state, the pressuriser volume includes saturated liquid and saturated steam. 
2.1.3 Steam generator 
The steam generators transfer the core thermal power towards the plant turbo-alternator. They use 
the reactor coolant heat to produce the saturated secondary steam which drives both the main 
turbine and the steam driven feed pumps. In order to supply a steam quality compatible with the 
efficient functioning of the turbine, the steam generators are equipped with moisture separators 
and driers to ensure that moisture carry-over will be less than 0.25% by weight on the steam 
outlet nozzle. They also act as a radiation barrier between the primary and secondary loops. After 
steam has done work in the turbine it is then condensed by being cooled by the tertiary loop and 
pumped back to the steam generators. The tertiary loop could either be sea (as in the case of 
Koeberg), lake or river water and is pumped back into the natural reservoir. 
                                                 
 
6 Sub-cooling refers to a liquid existing below its normal boiling point. 
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2.2 Reasons for baseload operation 
Baseload operation is the steady full load operation at all times, with few exceptions like coast 
down operation, stretch out operation, power reduction due to incidents or component failure and 
during Operating Technical Specification (OTS) fallbacks. The various reasons for this mode of 
operation are:  
 When NPPs contribute a small percentage of the grid’s total generating capacity; 
generation and demand can be balanced, and frequency controlled without requiring the 
nuclear units to be part of flexible operation. 
 Commercially, nuclear plants are preferred to operate at full power; this is due to the high 
capital cost with relatively low fuel costs. The priority is to maximise revenue in order to 
repay the loan taken for the NPP building. This would reduce the interest incurred and 
result in reaching the “break-even point”7 relatively early. 
 The design, licensing and operation of a nuclear plant operating at constant load are 
simpler. 
 Baseload operation is the least challenging for plant operation and maintenance. 
 Base-load operation uses nuclear fuel efficiently and outages can be planned accurately 
because fuel depletion estimations are accurate. 
2.3 Load following justification 
One of the major challenges the energy industry faces is that there is no direct way to store 
electrical energy in bulk. It therefore becomes an important requirement for the electrical systems 
to be able to continuously adjust the generating capacity to match the demand at different times of 
the day and during various seasons of the year. In order to compensate for electricity generation 
losses or gains or even changes in electrical energy demand, it may be necessary to change the 
output of certain generating units.  
When the renewable energy input increases in a grid that consists of a fair portion of nuclear 
power, the flexible operation of NPPs becomes significant. The significance of flexible operation 
becomes evident when the electrical energy input from the renewable energy power sources 
changes, due to changes in weather patterns, the NPPs have to increase or decrease load 
depending on load balancing requirements. The change in generating output of NPPs could be 
                                                 
 
7 Break-even point - defined as a point where total costs (expenses) and total sales (revenue) are equal. 
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planned or unplanned, automatic or manual and the load adjustment could be required within a 
short period of time. Therefore a flexible operating NPP must be able to stabilise power at any 
value, ramp power up/down at a defined ramp rate and participate in grid frequency control. 
 
Electricité De France (EDF) invested more than 15 years researching Flexible Power Operation 
and France is the most nuclear power dependant country in the world, therefore most operating 
experience with regards to load following comes from EDF (OECD, 2011). The majority of 
EDF’s nuclear fleet is designed for flexible power operation and mostly operate in load following 
mode. 
2.3.1 Reasons why SA should consider load following using NPPs 
The research carried out by a joint IAEA and EDF technical team concluded that the 
reasons for load following were one, or the combination, of the following factors (ZV, 
2014): 
1. Large percentage of the nuclear generating capacity; 
To minimise the overall operational costs in a grid that consists of a mixture of generating 
technologies, the generated output from the units with the high marginal costs are operated in 
a flexible mode. This is done to maximise the generation output from the units with low 
marginal costs. This is a possible scenario for South Africa in the event of introduction of 
17% (9.6 GW) of nuclear energy and 42% (18.2 GW) renewable energy (DoE, 2010). 
2. Rapid growth in renewable generation; 
This means that the total output from the units with low marginal costs increases. The South 
African government plans to increase the amount of renewable energy input into the energy 
mix, therefore flexible load operation will become necessary. According to IRP2019, the 
South African government is focusing on adding more renewable energy sources to supply 
the national electricity grid. 
3. Deregulation of the public electricity supply system; 
In Europe, many states have deregulated their electricity industry therefore making it 
lucrative for NPPs to follow load in order to benefit financially from the higher tariffs 
charged for reduced power operation. In a deregulated market, there is a financial incentive to 
generators when they follow load at a request by the grid controller. South African 
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government have resisted the trend to deregulate the electricity market, but the calls to 
consider the deregulation of the electricity supply are still persistent. 
 
4. Transmission constraints; 
Under certain conditions the capacity to transmit power from the NPP can be limited, forcing 
the NPP to operate at reduced load for an extended period of time. If the capacity of nuclear 
generation exceeds the minimum demand, it poses a challenge in controlling frequency, 
balancing generation and demand becomes impossible. Then it becomes imperative for NPPs 
to operate flexibly. 
5. Changes to the electricity market during the long operating lifetime of the NPP;  
The lifespan of the modified Generation II NPPs can be extended to operate for up to 60 
years and the country’s energy mix can change drastically over such a long period. A 
significant growth in renewables, like wind and solar, would also necessitate the traditionally 
base load stations to operate flexibly. Germany is a typical example of what effects a change 
in energy mix can have. The German laws were changed to prioritise energy generation from 
renewables. Since the renewables have limited controllability compared to the base load 
stations and also have varying output, the NPPs had to be able to operate flexibly (OECD, 
2011). South Africa could face similar challenges. 
2.4 Limitations on current Koeberg design 
All fatigue related transients are identified and accounted for and confirmed to be within 
design analysis criteria for the life cycle of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and 
auxiliary systems. All fluid system pressure, temperature and flow transients that have been 
considered when designing the RCS components have a maximum allowable number of 
cycles/occurrences for the life of the station. Each transient is classified under a pressure 
vessel code as Category I, II, III and IV. Any normal operating change in the plant’s 
operating status (e.g. RCS heat-up or cool down, power raising, turbine trip etc.) may become 
an “Accountable Transient” after transposition to the design transient list (Table: 1) even 
though they may not have exceeded a threshold or set point. 
 
Load following operating mode introduces transients that have not been accounted for in the 
original design of the core and the RCS. During low power operation, following a rapid load 
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reduction, the lower RCS average temperature (Tavg) affects the pressuriser spray nozzle 
integrity and the pressuriser surge line temperature. This is caused by the decrease in cold leg 
temperatures introducing thermal shock to the system.  
 
Therefore in order to ensure plant integrity and plant operation within the boot curve8, the 
surge line temperature limits must be respected. Flexible power operation might challenge 
these temperature limits and the integrity of the primary system might not be guaranteed 
during normal plant operations. The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) will require 
assurance that the safety limits will not be threatened during normal plant operation since it 
has the mandate to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50. According to the NNR the reactor 
coolant system (RCS) must meet the requirements of criteria 10 and 15 of 10 CFR 50 – 
Appendix A (NRC, 2014).  
 
Criteria 10 (Reactor design) states that “The reactor core and associated coolant, control and 
protection systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to ensure that specified 
acceptable fuel designed limits are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, 
including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences”.  Criteria 15 (Reactor coolant 
system design) states that “The reactor coolant system and associated auxiliary control and 
protection system shall be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design 
conditions of the reactor coolant pressure  boundary are not exceeded during any normal 
operation condition including anticipated operational occurrences”. 
 
The RCS design of the Koeberg units is based on maintaining the surge line temperature 
between 50 °C & 110 °C and the pressuriser spray nozzle temperature less than 177 °C 
(Eskom, 2007). Load following is not one of the transients that were considered and analysed 
in Koeberg Safety Analysis Report (KSAR). This can be seen in Framatome’s design 
transient list which is the basis for “Accountable Transient” programme at Koeberg (KAA-
652, n.d.). 
 
Although the control rods movement generate fast core reactivity change, they also cause 
power distribution changes that lead to changes in flux distribution, and they also add 
                                                 
 
8 Boot curve- Design operating envelop for normal plant operation 
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mechanical load on components like RCCS. An alternative method to control reactivity 
during load changes is to change the boron concentration in the RCS. Varying boron 
concentration has little effect on flux distribution but its effects are time delayed (5-10 
minutes) and its effectiveness depends heavily on core life. At the beginning of life (BOL) 
the boron concentration in the primary system is high (~2000 ppm) and low at end of life 
(~10 ppm). Once the primary system is borated at EOL, it is almost impossible to dilute the 
system for RCS temperature change. With RCS boron concentration < 40 ppm, a temperature 
change of 0.1 ˚C requires an addition of ~6000L of demineralised water. For example, if 
500L of borated water is added into the RCS at EOL, ~ 15m3 of demineralised water would 
be required in order to dilute the cooling water system and therefore stabilise reactor power.  
NB: Thumb-Rule for boron/dilution relationship is that for every 1ppm boron change, 30L of 
water is required i.e. in order to increase reactor power by reducing the boron concentration 
by 1 mg/kg, 30L of demineralised water would need to be added into the RCS. 
 
Therefore, changing boron concentration to compensate for load following will not be 
feasible because of the time delayed effects and the volume of water required to dilute the 
reactor coolant system at EOL. Any unplanned reactivity change increases the probability of 
a nuclear incident due to possible sudden power change and therefore unplanned reactivity 
changes are undesirable.  
 
There are also morning and evening electricity demands that could occur over a few hours 
and requires intervention by the National grid controller. The Koeberg units respond to any 
grid frequency increase of more than 4% (2 Hz) by decreasing turbine load. Under no 
circumstances will the units respond by increasing turbine load because they are base-load 
stations. They operate at full power, so any further load increase will challenge the thermal 
power safety limits which would be a violation of the Koeberg licence. A further turbine load 
increase would result in thermal limits being exceeded and the reactor operating outside the 
analysed zone for design base accidents, which would be a violation of the KSAR. Such 
event would have dire consequences for Koeberg operation since thermal limits are not to be 
exceeded under any circumstances. The mandatory requirement, to maintain reactor power 
below thermal limits, is in accordance with the Koeberg License Basis Manual. The purpose 
of the mandatory requirement is to ensure compliance with standards and processes of the 
license conditions and regulations (NNR, 2008).  
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List of design transients that will require close monitoring and continuous evaluation should the 
Koeberg units be required to load follow: 
 
Table 1: Design Transient List for Koeberg Unit 1&2 (KAA-652, n.d.) 
Description of Design Transient Maximum Occurrences 
Allowed during Reactor 
lifetime 
Heat up of RCS 180 
Depressurising and cooling down of the RCS 200 
Load increase at 5% per minute between 15% and 100% 2400 
Load increase at 5% per minute during stretch-out 80 
Sudden load increase from 90% to 100% full power 2000 
Sudden load decrease from 100% to 90% 2000 








Steady state fluctuations at power 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
During stretch-out 
1 700 000 
---------------------------- 
300 000  
Increasing the load between 0% and 15% full power 2200 
Decreasing the load between 15% and 0% power 2200 
Turbine trip from 100% load with partial condenser availability 
resulting in reactor scram 
80 
Loss of external electrical 400kV supplies 8 
Reactor trip from full power without inadvertent cool down (including 







Reactor trip from full power with cool down and no safety injection 60 
Reactor trip from full power with cool down and safety injection 10 
Depressurisation of RCS resulting in reactor trip and safety injection 20 
Inadvertent safety injection actuation 16 
Large amplitude transient (ΔT = 50 °C) 200 
Opening of relief valve 150 
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Opening of safety valve 20 
Ejection of control rod cluster 1 
 
Assuming the worst case scenario of daily power changes of more than 10%, it can be seen from 
the table above (sudden load decrease/increase) that the reactor vessel would need to be evaluated 
within 6 years, instead of the 10 yearly inspections. 
2.5 Set points to be monitored 
ΔP Set Points: 
1. Primary Circuit  = 1.0 MPa / 3 hour 
2. Steam Generator = 0.5 MPa / 3 hour 
 
ΔT Set Points: 
1. Primary Loops 
≥ 280 °C = 5 °C / 3 hour (Tavg) 
≤ 280 °C = 5 °C / 3 hour (Thot or Tcold) 
2. Pressuriser liquid phase = 6 °C / 3 hour 
3. RCV charging line = 20 °C / hour 
ΔP Set Points: 
Reactor load variation ≥ 20 % 
 
Table 1 above, indicates that the design of the current Koeberg units did not consider frequent 
load changes. Plant life would be significantly reduced by transients like: 
Heat up of RCS, depressurizing and cooling down of the RCS, Load increase at 5% per minute 
between 15% and 100%, sudden load increase from 90% to 100% full power, sudden load decrease from 
100% to 90% and House load or large load loss from 100%. All these transients are associated with load 
following and they would occur daily, with the exception of the house load event. Such daily occurrences 
would challenge the reactor protection design system and would require modification of the reactor 
protection logics. For example, a sudden change in RCS temperature changes the density of the coolant and 
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therefore affects fast neutron thermalisation. A change in neutron moderation would directly affect neutron 
flux and reactor protection trip signal on flux runaway might be generated. Note: A 5% flux change over 2 
seconds whether positive or negative, triggers a reactor trip.  
2.6 Load following modifications 
2.6.1 Some of the systems that would be affected 
Many plant systems will be directly affected by load following and will have to be modified. The 
following systems will be greatly affected:  
REA – Reactor Boron and Water Make-up System 
RGL – Rod Control System 
GRE – Turbine Governing System 
GSE – Turbine Protection System 
RPR – Reactor Control and Protection System 
TEP – Boron Recovery and Recycle System 
TEU – Liquid Waste Treatment System 
TES – Solid Waste Treatment System 
TEG – Gaseous Waste System 
REN – Nuclear Sampling System 
ARE – Feed water Flow Control System 
DVN – Nuclear Island Ventilation System 
VVP – Main Steam System 
RCV – Chemical and Volume Control System 
RCP – Reactor Coolant System 
GPV – Turbine Valves and Drain System 
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GCT – Turbine Bypass-Steam Dump System 
RPN – Nuclear Flux Instrumentation System 
Impact on each of the listed systems will have to be evaluated. 
2.6.2 Procedure changes and periodic testing  
Most of the current Koeberg operating procedures will have to be reviewed and changed to 
accommodate load following as normal operation. Some of the procedures that would be greatly 
affected are:  
 
 KWB-I-RGL (Rod Control System Malfunction),  
 KWB-I-5 (Loss of Main Off-Site Power),  
 KWB-G2 (Power Increase from Hot Standby and Reactor Control During Power 
Operation), 
 KWB-GS3 (Run-up, Synchronization and Power raising of the Turbine / Generator) and  
 KWB-GS4 (Programmed Shutdown of the Turbine – Generator Set). 
The periodical tests and the frequency of safety related and essential systems would also need to 
be reviewed. 
 
All the plant control circuits would need to be modified. Pressurizer level control, RCP pressure 
control logics, RGL control circuit, Tavg computer program (both reference and average 
temperatures), SG level program, reactor trip logics, controls, permissive and set points would 
also need to be reviewed. This would require NNR approval (NNR, 2008). 
2.6.3 Training of personnel 
According to NNR requirements for operator license holders at Koeberg, all the current Licensed 
and Non-licensed operators will have to be retrained and relicensed (NNR, 2008). Maintenance 
philosophy will also require to be changed and the maintenance regime updated. Training 
personnel will have to learn about NPPs load following operation, incidents and accidents 
associated with flexible operation. This would include creating new incident and accident 
scenarios to train and test operator competencies in dealing with nuclear accidents. New operating 
experience, related to plant degradation as a result of load following operations, would have to be 
sourced from international bodies like INPO, WANO and IAEA. The System Approach to 
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Training (SAT) would have to be used to analyze training requirements, design and develop a 
training program, implement and evaluate the effectiveness of such an intervention. This could 
necessitate sending training instructors abroad to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, it 
could also be necessary to hire training instructors from NPPs that operate in load following 
mode. The local tertiary institutions would also need to run academic programs to assist the 
nuclear industry in this regard.   
 
The Koeberg simulator is a full-scope control room simulator specific to the Koeberg units and 
will require improved models and computers in order to adequately simulate flexible plant 
operation. It will then be used to familiarize operators with the new operating procedures, develop 
operators’ diagnostic skills, train operators on how to operate the plant equipment safely and 
conservatively during load changes, incidents and accidents, and will also be used to troubleshoot 
the real plant problems. NNR has a requirement for training, examination and requalification of 
Licensed Operators to be performed on a plant specific simulator in order to eliminate the 
potential for negative training. NNR is guided by 10 CFR part 55 (Operator’s Licenses) and 
NUREG 1021 (Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors), therefore 
Koeberg License conditions will have to be reviewed (NRC, 2014). 
2.6.4 Fuel Design modifications  
In 1999, KEPCO & Westinghouse collaborated on a project to design fuel for load following 
NPPs (KEPCO, 2012). This design has been approved in Europe for use in most of the Gen III 
NPPs. The fuel designers boast about an improved structural integrity of fuel and the fact that it 
meets the IAEA’s four criteria for fuel integrity. The criteria give assurance that: 
 Fuel damage is guaranteed not be severe enough to prevent the rods from inserting into 
the core when required. 
 Fuel will stay intact during normal plant operation and during anticipated operational 
occurrences e.g. house load, islanding or turbine trip events. 
 The number of fuel rod failures determined conservatively i.e. it is not underestimated for 
postulated accidents. 
 The ability to cool fuel will always be maintained. 
This is a very important criterion to ensure compliance with ECCS criteria i.e. Emergency Core 
Cooling System response to a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The nuclear plant 
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vendors will have to demonstrate to the nuclear regulators that their designs meet the ECCS 
acceptance criteria including the effects that a higher burnup will have on cladding performance.  
The new improved fuel design was compared with the conventional fuel and confirmed to have 
an improved fuel performance and advanced mechanical integrity. According to KEPCO the 
advanced design features of the PLUS7 fuel are: 
 High mechanical strength i.e. mid grid buckling strength improved by 45%. 
 High thermal performance – overpower margin increased by more than 10%. 
 High burnup performance – batch average burnup increased from 45000 to 55000 
MWD/MTU. 
 Improved fretting wear resistance by increased grid to rod fretting wear resistance with 
conformal grid springs and dimples. 
 Enhanced fuel production by standardising the design and manufacturing processes. 
 Improved economy by enhancing uranium utilization and neutron economy. 
These improvements may increase vendor workload significantly and the licensing cost 
would also increase. 
2.7 Load following capability of GEN III NPPs (PWR) 
The 3rd Generation (GEN III) PWRs are designed with the capability to follow load 
repetitively in the range of 15-100% of the rated power. Although this capability is said 
to be available throughout the core life, there are certain limitations to the load following 
operation towards the end of life (EOL). According to the GEN III plant designers, the 
PWR can make step load changes of 20% of rated power and ramp changes of 5% of 
rated power per minute. A daily load cycle of 12-2-8-2 can be followed easily using these 
NPPs. This consists of a full power operation for 12 hours, load reduction to 50% power 
over a 2 hour period, operate at 50% for 8 hours and then increase load back to full load 
over 2 hours (Bruynooghe C, 2010). 
 
They are designed with a 50% load rejection capability, from full power, without a 
reactor trip. Load rejection could be as a result of a turbine runback signal or loss of main 
off-site power supply. Turbine runbacks can be triggered by a variety of incidents e.g. a 
loss of steam feed pump, high stator conductivity or failed islanding. A full load rejection 
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is also within the GEN III PWR’s design capabilities e.g. a turbine trip from 100% power 
without a reactor trip. The Gen II NPPs, like Koeberg, are also designed with the 
capability to accept a full load rejection from full power without a scram. This design 
capability is made possible by the ability of the secondary system to divert up to 85% of 
steam produced by the NSSS away from the turbines. 
2.8 Challenges and limitations to load following using Gen II reactors 
Changes to licensing basis, plant design and Safety Analysis Report are the overall 
challenges specific to changing a baseload NPP to a flexible operating plant. Technical 
challenges and limitations specific to load following are: Reactivity management, load 
following effects on control rods, integrity of the RCS boundary, increased radioactive 
effluent and change in generation and outage planning. 
 
2.8.1 Reactivity management effects 
- Nuclear poison9: neutron flux distortion 
- Use of soluble boron 
- Xenon transients, Uneven flux distribution 
2.8.2 Effects on control rods 
a) There will be a need for additional equipment and outage changes due to: 
- Increased wear on control rods and drive mechanism 
- Decreasing control rod worth due to fuel burnup 
b) There will be a change in preventative maintenance of: 
- Control rod drive mechanism 
- Control rods 
- RCC guide tubes 
- Mechanical structures of the coolant pressure boundary 
                                                 
 





c) Possible control Rod Failures: 
- Accidental withdrawal 
- Control mechanism failure (“uncontrolled withdrawal”) 
- Mechanical failure (ejection) 
- Misalignment 
- System Malfunction 
- Operator Error 
d) Modifications required: 
- Use of standard/black control rods (full neutron absorption strength) 
- Use of grey control rods (part neutron absorption strength) 
- Hot channel factors monitoring 
2.8.3 Physical integrity of components exposed to pressure and temperature transients 
- Pellet-Clad-Interaction (figure 4.2 in the next chapter): The PCI phenomenon is the main 
cause for clad failures in PWRs. The thermal expansion of the pellets, caused by gaseous 
and volatile fission products inside the pellets that cause swelling, reduces the gas volume 
inside the pellet and compresses the helium gas.  
- Most pump motors operate at constant speed with control valve controlling the flow. 
Control valves could operate outside their optimum opening position and therefore 
accelerate wear and tear of the valve internals. This is prevalent in steam systems and 
could increase corrosion and erosion of valves and pipe bends. 
- The secondary system (feed train) could experience water hammers. 
The National Energy Technology Laboratory of the United State of America found out that: 
• Pipe thermal stress and fatigue cracking were some of the most significant problems with 
load following.  
• Condenser tube grooving at the support plates can occur due to poor water chemistry. 
• Feed water heater tube grooving at the support plates can occur due to poor water 
chemistry. 
• Most fan motors are constant speed, requiring more oscillation of the dampers during 
load following. This causes wear and tear on dampers and motors (NETL, 2012). 
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2.8.4 Operator’s responsibility with regards to power distribution  
• Verify correct rod bank sequence and overlap 
• Maintain flux deviation within the acceptable band 
• Verify QPTR less than the OTS limit 
• Maintain rods above Rod Insertion limit 
• Keep each rod cluster within 24 steps of control bank demand 
2.8.5 Increased radioactive effluent 
For load decrease while maintaining uniform flux around the core, boric acid solution 
must be added. The reactor coolant system is a constant volume system therefore for 
every cubic meter of boric acid solution added into the system, the same volume of 
reactor coolant must be removed and sent to the waste treatment system. This would be 
the case for load increase also; the amount of demineralized water added into the primary 
system will result in the same volume of borated water being diverted to the waste 
treatment system. This could result in chemistry upsets and increase in general plant 
radiation levels. Therefore large amounts of borated and processed water can be used 
wastefully. With South Africa being a water scarce country this would necessitate a 
desalination plant to be added to the design. The current water processing unit will have 
to be modified to cope with the erratic water usage.  
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CHAPTER 3: Factors Affecting Electrical Grid 
A case for including load following ability into design for SA nuclear fleet 
In order to accommodate the proposed energy mix, in accordance with the IRP2010, 
there are several considerations that need to be explored: Load following using NPPs, 
deregulation of the South African electricity markets, transmission constraints and 
possible changes to the electricity markets. This dissertation focuses on NPP load 
following.  
 
3.1 Load Following 
The South African government planned to increase the amount of clean energy input into 
the energy mix, by increasing the current nuclear energy input to 17% and renewable 
energy input to 40% (DoE, 2011). This was according to IRP2010. The latest plan 
focuses on increasing energy input from renewable sources, this is according to IRP2019. 
A rapid growth in renewable generation together with a large percentage of the nuclear 
generating capacity in the energy mix, requires NPPs to operate in load following mode. 
This change in operating philosophy is driven by economic factors and efficient power 
generation. Load following operation of the traditionally baseload power generating units 
enables generation output from the units with low marginal costs to be maximized. Such 
operation results in low cost electric power production and maximum use of green 
technologies, since coal fired power plants are also part of the baseload power generating 
units. This would be favourable to consumers and since SA is one of the countries that 
adopted the United Nations Framework on Climate Change it has a mandate to stabilise, 
limit and reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Therefore the use of 
renewable energy, whenever it is available, will play a role in keeping the global 
warming below 2°C as agreed upon in 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21, 2015). 
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3.2 Deregulation of the South African electricity markets 
Arguments in favour for deregulation of the local electricity markets have been ongoing 
for several years in S.A, with some experts arguing that S.A. is lagging behind other 3rd 
world countries which already deregulated their electricity markets (Convention, 2014). 
The call for rigorous transformation of the electricity market was repeated at the 64th 
AMEU10 Convention. At the moment South Africa has not followed the global trend for 
deregulation of electricity markets, although even many African countries have. The 
South African government’s philosophy leans towards central planning and state control. 
Should the government’s position change in favour of deregulation of electricity market, 
it will be more lucrative for NPPs to follow load since they will benefit from higher 
tariffs charged for reduced power operation. This is a topic that needs an independent 
research of its own. 
3.3 Transmission constraints 
Under certain conditions, the capacity to transmit power from the NPP can be limited 
therefore forcing the NPP to operate at reduced load for an extended period of time. Such 
operation results in Xenon oscillations which then cause uneven flux distribution. 
Therefore, designing NPPs with load following capabilities is an advantage. Changes to 
the structure of electricity supply system can also lead to transmission constraints. As the 
capacity of nuclear generation increases in the energy mix it poses a challenge with 
regards to grid frequency control. A sudden loss of a big load (>5% of the total load on 
the grid) in the grid would require the baseload units to adjust load by reducing output 
power in order to maintain frequency at 50 Hz. Since Thyspunt is the approved site for 
the new NPPs, this means that the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces would rely on 
nuclear power for baseload energy supply. The load adjustments would have to be 
performed by NPPs. This might be the scenario that South Africa will be faced with after 
adding 9.6 GW of nuclear power into the grid.  
                                                 
 
10 Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings is an association of municipal electricity distributors 
as well as national, parastatal, commercial, academic and other organizations that have direct interest in the 




SA also has an operating experience when it comes to transmission constraints. Veld fires 
under the 400 kV lines once rendered one of the transmissions lines outside Koeberg 
Power Station inoperable. This event occurred on 16th November 2005 and required the 
nuclear reactors to be operated at reduced power for a prolonged period of time (>72 
hours), one of the two units had to be placed in Hot Shutdown state (HSD) in order to 
ensure reactor safety. The Western Cape suffered several blackouts as a result of this 
incident. If the Koeberg units were equipped with load following capability, they could 
have both reduced load to 50% and the shutdown would have been avoided. Reactor 
start-up from HSD to full power can take up to a week, therefore an unnecessary 
shutdown could have been avoided. 
3.4 Changes to the electricity market during the long operating lifetime of the NPP 
The life span of the modified Generation II plants can be extended to operate for up to 60 
years and the country’s energy mix can change drastically over such a long period. A 
significant growth in renewables, like wind and solar, might also necessitate the 
traditionally base load stations to operate flexibly. Germany is a typical example of what 
effects a change in energy mix can have (OECD, 2011). The German laws were changed 
to prioritize energy generation from renewables. Since the renewables have limited 
controllability compared to the base load stations and also have varying output, the NPPs 





CHAPTER 4: SIMULATION 
This chapter will interrogate the response of the Koeberg units to one of the biggest load 
variations possible, the house load11 event. Big load variations will be more likely to occur 
frequently when the current energy mix changes to that planned in IRP2010-30. A house load 
event is also one of the design events that poses danger to reactor fuel should there be no 
Operator intervention, as illustrated in this research.  
 
IRP2010 proposed an increase of the nuclear share in the energy mix to 23% and also to 
introduce a significant amount (43%) of renewable energy into the energy mix (DoE, 2010). Even 
with the subsequent elimination of nuclear power as a baseload in IRP2019, the threats caused by 
electrical grid disturbances would still exist. An increase in modular power sources, which are 
intermittent by nature, would result in more frequency and voltage variations and that increases 
the likelihood of the Koeberg units automatically disconnecting from the national grid i.e. house 
load.  
 
Note: IRP 2010 was used for reference purposes since it specified the amounts of energy 
addition from various technologies. IRP 2019 is not that specific about the amounts of 
planned nuclear capacity addition. It is bias towards adding extra capacity in increments 
and categorizes nuclear power as inflexible capacity. This is true for Koeberg reactors 
due to the old design that did not foresee the need for flexible operation of a nuclear plant 
in South Africa. This further highlights the need for load following capabilities to be 
considered for future nuclear plants in South Africa in order to improve the 
competitiveness of nuclear technology when compared with other technologies. Note: 
The validity of this study is not based on government’s timeframes for building nuclear 
                                                 
 
11 The action whereby the Nuclear Power Plant automatically disconnects its turbine from the 
national electrical grid and only supplies its own auxiliaries. NB: House load is triggered by 




plants, the argument is valid irrespective of the implementation time i.e. the load 
following capability argument would still be applicable to the 2500MW nuclear build 
programme mentioned in Decision 8 of IRP2019. 
 
The Koeberg simulator was used to perform all the scenarios and to collect the data used for 
illustration. The data was collected and compared between Beginning of Core Life (BOL) and 
End of Core Life (EOL) scenarios. The EOL scenarios were used in order to illustrate the worst 
case scenario that the load variations would have on nuclear fuel.  
Notes: 
 The scenarios were limited to 1 hour runs over four weeks due to the limited availability 
of the simulator. 
 It is also important to note that for the following simulations there was no operator 
intervention, so there was no credit taken for the highly trained Reactor Operators who 
would have been in the control room. Should Operator actions be taken into 
consideration, this event would be an acceptable incident i.e. it would require Koeberg 
Power Station to report it to NNR and would be subject to the limitation (120 house load 
events for the lifetime of the power station) stipulated in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Justification for EOL demonstration as the worst case scenario for load following 
Fuel pellets for the PWRs (Gen II & III) are made of sintered UO2. During manufacture only 95% 
of the theoretical density of UO2 is achieved (KEPCO, 2012). Under the high operating 
temperature of the reactor, their density may increase. This would cause the whole stack of pellets 
to shorten. A stuck pellet would cause a gap.  In the region of the gap, the moderator/fuel ratio 
increases, and since the reactor is under moderated, the reactivity and thermal flux will peak at 
that location. The adjacent pellets produce more power as a result and could lead to a local over 
power situation, especially at EOL. Load following exacerbates the localized over power effect, 
especially on Gen II reactors. 
Load changes in a nuclear plant are more challenging at EOL mostly because of two reasons: 
1. Copious amounts of water are needed to dilute the RCS at low boron concentration. 
There are restrictions on dilution flow rate, the demineralised water reservoirs are finite 
and the rate of waste water treatment is low.  
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2. At EOL, xenon oscillations are more likely to start and very difficult to control. These 
oscillations lead to core over power and uneven fuel burnup. 
Therefore the cost of water processing and the difficulty to control axial flux distribution are the 
main challenges. The axial flux distribution is a reactivity management issue therefore a nuclear 
safety concern. 
One of the main core safety limits is the maximum fuel temperature limit of 2590 °C. The basis 
for this limit is to prevent fuel centreline melt which occurs at 2804 °C. The fuel centreline melt 
is based on new UO2 fuel pellets. The melt point temperature decreases with exposure to 
radiation, approximately 32°C for every 10,000 MWD/MTU (RFE, 2015). The melt point 
temperature limit is therefore conservative for fuel assemblies up to 67,000 MWD/MTU burnup, 
which corresponds to EOL, since irradiated fuel melts at lower temperature. At EOL the fuel 
centreline temperature would be significantly higher than at BOL because of the crud layer that 
coats the fuel cladding (Figure 4). This layer of crud affects heat transfer from the fuel pellets to 
the reactor coolant. Since PWRs are designed to operate at constant average reactor coolant 
temperature, the fuel temperature would increase in order to maintain a constant RCS 
temperature. The pellet clad temperature (approximately 350 °C) depends on the heat transfer 
coefficients in fuel, helium gap, cladding, convection film and LPD12.  
NB: The fuel cladding temperature is limited to 1200 °C to prevent Zirconium-water reaction. 
All these parameters are affected by neutron bombardment during core life. The fuel clad 
temperature is limited by limiting the linear power density. In order to illustrate the operating 
point of the Koeberg units on Figure 5, the average LPD for the entire core at full power was 
determined. 
 
Core data is:   
Each fuel rod is 4m (active fuel height = 3.65m) 
157 fuel assemblies in the core 
264 fuel rods per assembly (FA) of which 42 are guide thimbles (GT) 
Core thermal power is 2775 MW 
Solution: 
                                                 
 




Average linear power density     = 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
 
             =      
𝑄 [𝑘𝑊]
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒) (𝐹𝐴−𝐺𝑇)×𝐿 [𝑚]
            
   
     = 
2.775 × 106kW
3.65 (222) (157) 𝑚
 
     = 21.8 kW/m ≡ 218 W/cm 
 
Fuel centreline temperature at full power is ~ 1000 °C (RFE, 2015). Figure 3 indicates that the 
Koeberg reactors operate at a higher than average linear power density. This demonstrates that as 
the fuel centreline temperature increases toward EOL the safety margin decreases. Therefore the 
hot spot of the fuel centreline temperature could approach the fuel centreline temperature limit 











Figure 3: Fuel Centreline Temperature vs Linear Power Density (NRC, 2007) 
 
 
At EOL, the risk of reaching the maximum LPD is high as a result of fuel changes during reactor 
operation. The helium gap between clad and fuel is reduced over core life. This is caused by the 
swelling of the fuel pellet, narrowing the fuel cladding gap. This phenomenon is known as the 
Pellet Clad Interaction (PCI) and is undesirable because it could lead to fuel damage. Load 
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inside the primary circuit, which causes the clad to be pushed onto the fuel pellets resulting in 
clad creep13.  
 
 




                                                 
 
13 Clad Creep is defined as the slow irreversible deformation of fuel cladding influenced by a variety of 




Figure 5: above: Picture showing fuel cladding collapse resulting in fuel perforation: a) 
  
 
Before fuel-cladding interaction, b) fuel-cladding interaction, c) fuel-cladding interaction took 
place at most part of the fuel column, 1) coolant effect, 2) diametric effect of fuel column, 3) 
axial effect of the fuel column part (David G. Franklin, 1988).  
Although fuel cladding damage can occur during normal plant operation, it is highly probable 
during major load variations like house loading or load following, especially at end of core life. 
This is mainly due to the elevated fuel temperature, more negative moderator temperature 
coefficient, and the reduced soluble boron content in the RCS. Any system temperature and 
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4.2 Simulator Set-up 
Table 4.1: Initial Conditions (Plant operating at full power at EOL) 
                                                        Main 
Parameters 
 
Reactor Power 2747 MWth  
Generator Power/output 962 MWe 
Boron Concentration 12 ppm 
Rods Position 220 steps 
Average RCS Temperature 296 °C 
RCS Pressure 15.3 MPa 
Pressuriser Level -2.1 m 
Core Burn-up EOL 
Xenon -2827 pcm 
Samarium -974 pcm 
Flux Deviation (ΔI) +0.07 
 
4.3 House load event simulation 
A house load is an automatic plant response to a loss of 400 kV supply, triggered by the opening 
of the 400 kV breaker supply to each of the Koeberg units. There is a list of signals that could 
initiate the opening of the 400 kV breaker with the unit at power e.g. manual opening of the 
breaker, high voltage yard voltage fault, generator under or over-frequency etc. For this 
simulation a manual breaker opening was initiated at time [t] = 100s. The 100s time delay was to 
allow the plant parameters to stabilize. When the 400 kV breaker opens, turbine rejects load from 
970 MW to 40 MW instantly. The turbine bypass system then activates and creates an alternative 
steam release path to remove the steam generated.  
Note: The house load event was simulated until all parameters stabilized (~2000s) and then the 





Figure 6: Reactor coolant temperature transient 
 
The house load event reduced the amount of steam extracted from the steam generators and 
results in less heat removal from the reactor coolant. As the average reactor coolant temperature 
(Tavg) increased, the control rods automatically inserted into the core to stop Tavg by reducing 
reactor power. The insertion of control rods, as illustrated in Figure 7, was triggered by the RCS 
temperature deviation of > 0.56 °C between Tavg and the reference temperature of the reactor 
coolant (Tref). When the house loading signal was inserted, a Tavg spike was observed (Figure 6) 
and it was terminated by the control rods auto-insertion into the core. The motion of the control 
rods together with the actuation of the turbine bypass system (Figure 8) resulted in a continuous 
decrease of Tavg to a new reference temperature below 286 °C.  
NB: Tavg should have stabilized at a no-load value of 286 °C.  
The temperature control systems halted the temperature drop at 286 °C but Xenon build-up was 
still adding negative reactivity into the core. Tavg continued to decrease to ~285 °C. The effect of 
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Figure 7: Control Rods movement (in simulation described in text) 
 
As soon as Tavg / Tref deviation exceeded 2.8 °C, the control rods were observed inserting into the 
core at maximum insertion speed, 72 rod steps/minute, from their fully withdrawn position of 220 
steps. This resulted in control rods inserting past the control rods insertion limits and such 
operation evokes a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). Control rods should not be allowed 
to insert below the insertion limits because of three reasons:  
 The worst case scenario for postulated rod ejection accident, according to the KSAR, was 
when the control rods were low into the core i.e. below control rods insertion limits. 
 According to KSAR, accident analysis assumed that the flux deviation (delta-I) would be 
< 5% whenever reactor power > 87% (Eskom, 2007). Delta-I is a critical safety 
parameter which is monitored and control by the Reactor Operators, maintained < 5% at 
during high reactor power operation. In this event, the flux deviation was > 20% due to 
control rods inserting too deep into the core (see Figure 7). 
 Rods should always be maintained at the rod bite position in order to be effective 
immediately. This ensures that should a load rejection incident occur, the differential rod 
worth available at rod bite position is adequate for control systems to respond as 
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Figure 8: Actuation of the Turbine Bypass-Steam Dump System 
 
The turbine bypass system is designed to remove the energy produced by the reactor if the energy 
produced by the reactor exceeds the energy removed by the turbine. Turbine bypass valves were 
observed opening fully in order to remove excess energy from the primary system. The opening 
of turbine bypass valves is triggered by a temperature deviation of > 2.8 °C between Tavg and Tref. 
In Figure 8 above, the turbine bypass valves were observed fully closing at 288 °C in an attempt 
to maintain a balance between energy used and energy produced. This occurred in about 1150s 
into the simulation. Xenon continued to insert negative reactivity into the core and therefore 
reducing Tavg below the no load value of 286 °C. In order to maintain the reactor online (for 
simulation purposes), turbine load was increased (at time 2000s) to full power level. This action 

































Turbine Bypass Valves Open




Figure 9: Pressuriser level transient 
 
The pressuriser level transient followed the same trend as the Tavg transient observed in Figure 6 
i.e. initial increased, followed by a continuous decrease as a result of rods insertion and steam 
extraction via turbine bypass system. This phenomenon is caused by the expansion of the spaces 
between the water molecules with increasing temperature, followed by shrinking as the Tavg 
temperature decreases. Note: This is the only indication available for RCS inventory in most Gen 
II reactors. During normal operations (0-100% reactor power), the level indication must always 
be > -3.7m. Loss of pressurizer level indication is not acceptable because it is the only indication 
of reactor coolant inventory. From the illustration above (Figure 9), it is demonstrated that the 






















Figure 10: Illustration of fission reaction as indicated by thermal power 
 
The fission reaction rate (indicated by % thermal power) decreased due to the negative 
moderator temperature co-efficient (Figure 10). As the coolant temperature increased, as 
illustrated in figure 6, its density decreased. This resulted in reduction of thermal 
neutrons available to cause fission and that caused a negative change of reactivity. This is 
an inherent safety feature designed to shut the reactor down when cooling is lost or 
reduced. The rate of neutron flux reduction is also dependent on the differential rod 
worth, which is why the minimum rod bite is important (refer to initial rods position in 
Table 4.1). The minimum rod bite provides for a minimum reactivity insertion of about 
2.5 pcm/step. This insertion rate is sufficient to prevent a reactor trip from over 




























































Figure 11: Reactivity added by the main fission product poisons Xe-135 & Sm-149 
 
NB: Prior to the house load event the reactor has been operating at full power for sufficiently 
long duration therefore Xe & Sm were assumed to be at equilibrium. 
The amount of negative reactivity added by Xenon was observed to be more than 3 times the 
amount added by Samarium. From the beginning of the transient till the end, Xe changed by 
~10% while Sm change was negligible ~0.4%. 
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Delta I is the neutron flux difference between the upper and lower section of the core i.e. axial 
flux difference. As control rods inserted into the core, they suppressed the neutron flux at the 
upper section of the core and resulted in negative delta I i.e. more neutron flux at the bottom 
section of the core. This meant that more power was produced at the bottom section of the core 
than on the upper section. That poses an over-power threat to the reactor which could result in 
core damage. Shutdown margin, as indicated by various rod insertion alarms, was also inadequate 
since the control rod position was below the low insertion limit (Figure 7). Shutdown margin is 
an OTS requirement, and is achieved by borating the reactor coolant in accordance with the 
Physics Data Book14 requirements. This operation was outside the permissible neutron flux 
difference operating band of (+/-5%). As illustrated in Figure 12 above, delta I was > 20%. 
 
 
Figure 13: Pressuriser pressure transient 
 
As the pressuriser level increased, with an increase in Tavg, the steam bubble was adiabatically 
compressed and pressure rapidly increased. The pressuriser pressure control circuit is fitted with a 
Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) unit, which reacted to the rate of change of the error 
signal. Although the spray valves opened immediately to reduce RCS pressure, the pressure 
                                                 
 
14 Physics Data Book is a compilation of the reactor core data illustrated in figures and tables and it is 
specific to a certain nuclear fuel core. PDB is compiled by Reactor Fuel Engineers and used by the Reactor 




























continued to increase above the normal operation pressure set point of 15.5 MPa. The Power 
Operated Relief Valve (PORV) with the low set-point (15.9 MPa) was observed opening to stop 
the RCS pressure increase, therefore preventing the operation of safety relief valves and thus 
ensuring RCS integrity. The pressure increase was therefore terminated by the automatic opening 
of the PORV. NB: Figure 13 indicates that the PORV opened before the set point of 15.9 MPa 
and stopped the pressure spike at 15.69 MPa. This is because the PORV is rate sensitive. 
 
It was observed that the pressure increase was terminated before the pressuriser level stabilised at 
normal working level (Figure 14). When the pressuriser level decreased towards the new set 
point, the RCS pressure decreased rapidly. The pressure drop was caused by the pressuriser spray 
valves & PORV being open and was exacerbated by the decrease in reactor coolant temperature 
illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
The Pressuriser pressure control system automatically actuated the fixed heaters to increase RCS 
pressure while sending another signal to close the pressuriser spray valves. The pressuriser level 
and pressure control circuit together with the average reactor coolant temperature control circuits 
responded differently to the load rejection transient and resulted in an extended transient time. 
This can be observed in Figures 14 & 15. 
 




















































RCS pressure vs PZR level
RCS P (MPa) Prz level (m)
 45 
 
In this house load event, a maximum of 2.5% pressure spike during the RCS temperature swing 
was observed. It was triggered by reactor coolant temperature increase caused by the load reject. 
The power operated relief valve opened and caused a 5.1% pressure drop. The pressure transient 
was so big that the normal pressure control system could not stabilise pressure within normal 
operating limits. The automatic operation of the PORVs stopped the pressure increase and 
prevented the opening of safety valves.  The operation of safety valves is undesirable because 
they are the ultimate protection of the primary system integrity. By design, safety valves are 
reliable in opening but they might not re-seat properly. A partially opened safety valve would 
result in a continuous system pressure drop due to inventory loss.  
 
The temperature control systems (turbine bypass and control rods) then responded and restored 
the average Tavg to within normal operating parameters (see Figures 7 & 8) and the pressuriser 
pressure control system started controlling pressure (~1200s into the scenario).  
 
 
Figure 15: RCS temperature vs level transient 
 
The relationship between the average reactor coolant system (Tavg) and the pressuriser level (Lpzr) 
demonstrate the effects that Tavg has on Lpzr. All the postulated accidents used in KSAR assumed 
Tavg > 284 C as a baseline, therefore Tavg < 284 C would mean that the plant operated outside the 
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15, it can be seen that without the load increase (@time 2000s) at maximum rate, Tavg would have 
decreased < 284 °C. 
Figure 16: Steam generator shrink and swell transient 
Steam generator (SG) level initially decreased as a result of the increase in steam generator 
pressure which then collapsed the steam bubbles and returned them to liquid form. This resulted 
in decreased steam generator level, referred to as a shrink effect in the nuclear industry. When the 
steam dump valves opened, the steam generator pressure decreased causing more steam bubbles 
to be formed. The SG levels then increased due to the swell effect. The level control systems then 
responded and controlled the level at the required level set point in accordance with the Steam 
Generator level program. It is important to note that the SG level variations (Figure 16) are an 

































SG Level vs SG pressure
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the most possible burnout of xenon, at 2000s the reactor power was increased to full power while 
xenon was approaching the maximum peak conditions. NB: The only reason why such an 
operation was possible is because the xenon dead time15 is not simulated. This is because the 
reactor has low thermal flux levels (about 5x1012 neutrons/cm2-sec), most xenon is removed by 
decay as opposed to neutron absorption (NRC, 2007)16. It was observed than Xe build up added 
about 11% [2800 to 3100 pcm] of negative reactivity into the core. 
 
Figure 20: Reactivity added by the main fission product poisons Xe & Sm 
Another neutron poison that is worth mentioning is Samarium-149 (Sm-149), because it has the 
second most significant effects on reactor operation due to its high thermal neutron absorption 
cross section. The behaviour of Sm-149 is different from Xe-135 because its nuclear properties 
are also different. The difference between Xenon and Samarium is that Sm-149 is not radioactive 
and does not decay. Sm-149 always adds negative reactivity because it builds up from loss of 
burn out. It can be seen (Figure 20 above) during reactor power reduction that Sm-149 builds-up 
as a result of the decay of promethium-149 and the reduction of the burn up factor, but once the 
                                                 
 
15 Xenon dead time is the period of time where the reactor is unable to override the effects of xenon. 
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equilibrium is reached, its concentration remains constant for the rest of full power operation. The 
Sm-149 build-up was stopped by the reactor power increase (back to full power) and that was due 
to Sm-149 burn-up. It can be seen from Figure 4.9 that Sm-149 poisoning is minor compared to 
Xe-135 poisoning, less by a factor of 3. 
Control rods (Figure 7): The insertion of control rods was made worse by the absence of operator 
intervention i.e. no boron addition was performed. Control rods should not be allowed to insert 
below the low insertion limits. The low insertion limits are designed to: 
 Minimise the consequences of rod ejection accident. That is why rods must be kept above 
the active core. 
 Maintain acceptable in-core flux distribution. As rods insert into the core, they disturb 
flux distribution. The natural flux profile disturbance caused by the rod insertion is 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
 Ensure adequate shutdown margin assuming that the rod with the highest worth is stuck 
out of the core. 
It can be seen that without the addition of boron into the RCS, following a house load, the nuclear 
safety design limits will be challenged.  
Figure 7 illustrates the challenge to the power distribution limits, which should not be exceeded 
during normal and abnormal plant operation. OTS specifies that rod insertion limits should 
always be maintained above their insertion limits regardless of power level. Due to the 
importance of this requirement, there are alarms in the control room to warn the operator when 
the insertion limit has been reached or is going to be reached and instruct the operator to take 
action. 
Temperature transient (Figure 6): Due to the inherent design of the PWRs, the Tavg increase 
results in decrease in reactor power due to Doppler Effect. The Tavg channel is slower than the 
power mismatch channel because Tref passes through a lag unit in the rod control system, before it 
is compared to Tavg. This lag is used to optimise the rods control system response to the other 
design transients of the rod control system e.g. 10% step load changes (positive or negative) and 





Figure 17: Tref Program (Eskom, 2007) 
Tavg decreasing below 286 °C during a house load event is not an acceptable occurrence. In this 
case, a carefully controlled dilution would have been used to offset the xenon effect instead of 
increasing load. Increasing reactor power from 10%, while xenon is adding maximum negative 
reactivity at EOL, is not possible in a reactor as big as the Koeberg reactors. It would take about 
10 hours for xenon to reach its peak, after which a load increase could be initiated. 
Level transient (Figure 10): The pressuriser level transient threatened the isolation of letdown 
flow which occurs automatically when level drops below -4.6m. A letdown flow isolation would 
have posed an indirect threat to RCS integrity since the pressuriser would have filled up until 
2.6m and the reactor would have automatically tripped.  
Pressure transient (Figure 13): The pressure transient observed during this house load scenario 
could lead to clad creep and also threaten the sub-cooling margin in a PWR design. The pressure 
increase causes a reduction in the gap between the fuel pellet and the clad as illustrated in Figure 
4 & 5. The amount of heat transferred from the fuel to the coolant gets affected i.e. the rate of 
heat transfer decreases. This results in an increased operating fuel temperature which then leads 








and prevent DNB17, there are two automatic reactor trips associated with pressure excursions. The 
reactor is designed to trip automatically if the RCS pressure increases to 17 MPa or decreases to 
13 MPa. During the house load simulation scenario, the RCS pressure peak was less than 16 MPa 
therefore the integrity of the primary system was not challenged. 
Axial offset (Figure 12): Delta I is used for reactor protection, it provides overpower protection 
and places operational restrictions in case of a skewed flux i.e. uneven power distribution. In 
order to maintain the heat flux hot channel factor within the acceptable limits, the axial flux 
difference must be maintained less than 5%. 
During normal operation, the LPD must be less than 418 W/cm; this value ensures that if a LOCA 
were to occur, the maximum cladding temperature would not exceed 1 200°C. Therefore, 
maintaining ΔI within the trapezium (Figure 18 - design limits) would ensure that core melt 
would not occur. The I operating mode is determined by the following conditions: 
 Reactivity is controlled by adjusting the reactor coolant system boron concentration. 
 Axial offset is controlled by control rod motion. 
Authorized Band for Axial Flux Difference is governed by OTS Limiting Condition of Operation. 
Maintaining the axial flux difference [I] for a power above 15%Pn, within  5% of reference 
value [I ref] which varies with power and burnup, will result in a constant axial offset.  
                                                 
 
17 Departure from Nucleate Boiling is defined as the point at which the heat transfer from the fuel rod 
rapidly decreases due to the insulating effect of a steam blanket that forms on the control rod surface when 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 NNR would not allow the Koeberg units to follow load 
The nuclear regulator lists nine major safety functions that must be maintained to ensure safety of 
PWR nuclear power plant operation (NNR, 2008): 
 Heat removal from reactor core – main turbine generator system, steam generators, steam 
dump system and turbine bypass control. 
 Reactivity control – control rods drive system, chemical and volume control system. 
 RCS inventory control – pressuriser level control system and chemical and volume 
control system. 
 Reactor pressure control – pressuriser pressure control. 
 Containment integrity – pressuriser relief tank, containment cooling system, containment 
spray system. 
 Radioactive release – liquid waste system, waste gas disposal system.  
 Electrical power supply – emergency diesel generators, A.C. and D.C. Electrical 
distribution. 
 Instrumentation – reactor protection system, nuclear instrumentation system, process 
radiation system. 
 Plant service systems – component cooling water system, spent fuel pool cooling system, 
fire protection system. 
From the chapter 4 analysis and discussions it was evident that 5 out of these 9 major safety 
functions were challenged and therefore nuclear power plant safety was compromised.  
The heat removal from the reactor core was excessive resulting in moderator temperature 
decreasing below the no load temperature value of 286˚C (Figure 4.3). This affects reactivity 
control by adding positive reactivity to the core because of the negative moderator temperature 
coefficient (-MTC)18. The light water reactors are designed with a -MTC which is a safety 
function to shut down the reactor in case of any incident that causes a rapid temperature 
                                                 
 
18 -MTC means that there is less than optimum amount of moderator between fuel rods, therefore an 




increase. The physics behind this phenomenon can be explained in terms of the six factor 
formula. In this event, the low insertion limits of the control rod banks were exceeded (Figure 
4.4) and that is not allowed in accordance with Operating Technical Specification (OTS). The 
decrease in reactor coolant system inventory below -4m level in the pressuriser (Figure 4.6), as a 
direct result of reactor coolant temperature-drop, increases the demand from the reactor boron and 
water make-up system. Letdown flow automatically isolated to reduce the effects of a loss of 
coolant, and pressuriser heaters automatically de-energised for heaters burn-out protection. The 
reactor pressure control was therefore unstable as can be observed in Figure 4.11. This transient 
resulted in a significant increase in nuclear waste water production and later yielded more nuclear 
waste water that needed to be treated. This puts a huge burden on the liquid radioactive waste 
processing plant. This has a direct effect on radioactive release which is one of the major safety 
functions that must be maintained at minimum in a NPP. The loss of shutdown margin indicated 
in Figure 4.9 (Delta I) is a non-compliance to OTS, therefore not allowed during normal plant 
operation. 
Accurately measuring the reactor water level in a NPP is critical to safe operation of the plant. 
Since the Generation II NPPs, like Koeberg, do not have reactor water level indication, load 
transients that result in decreasing pressuriser level (as indicated in Figure 4.6) pose a threat of 
core uncovering. 
Based on this technical finding, the Koeberg units cannot be operated safely under load following 
conditions. NNR would therefore not issue the Koeberg plant with a licence to operate as a load 
following station. 
5.2 The current plant design does not allow load following 
Flexible operation of the Koeberg Operating Units is technically possible but it will require plant 
modifications, procedure reviews & changes and the FSAR will have to be revised. Plant 
modifications could take up to 5 years, then procedural changes could take up to 2 years and the 
SAR review would take about 5 years. Such changes would be outside the scope of running 
Koeberg as stipulated by NIL-01, therefore extra funds and resources would be required.  An 




In order to meet the IAEA requirements and guidelines, a technical review and relicensing of 
Koeberg would be necessary. In a developing country like South Africa, these processes can be 
long, tedious and costly. The time and cost of plant modification, loss of revenue, training of 
operating and maintenance personnel and relicensing the NPP and Reactor Operators cannot be 
justified.  
 
In addition, the Koeberg units only contribute about 4.5% supply to the South African grid, 
therefore they achieve the highest efficiency and economic benefits when operating as baseload 
stations i.e. at full power.  The grid input from nuclear plants is not big enough to require load 
following by the existing plants and since electricity price is regulated in SA, there is no incentive 
for the NPPs to operate at reduced load. 
The stipulated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) criteria requires the NPP manufacturers 
to design emergency core cooling systems that can accomplish a cladding temperature of < 1204 
°C following a LOCA. As illustrated with RCS temperature spike, pressure spike and flux 
deviation (Figure 4.3, Figure 4.9 & Figure 4.10 respectively), the ECCS criteria would be 
challenged. The 1204 °C limit meant to prevent the Zirc-Water reaction, which would result in 
high hydrogen production inside containment during a LOCA. That would be a direct threat to the 
3rd radiation release barrier (the containment) because of the increased risk of hydrogen 
explosion. 
All Generation III power plants are designed with load following capabilities and it is highly 
likely that the next fleet of nuclear plants to be built in SA will be Generation III. NNR will have 
to deal with challenges of limited resources and experience in order to regulate load following 
NPPs and deal with technical issues that could be technology specific. NNR will therefore have to 
invest in staff training and hiring specialists in order to understand the operating limits and 
conditions, the design (fuel & reactor control), inspection and maintenance programs, supporting 
research & development programs, periodic testing requirements and plant commissioning. 
5.3 Extended Reduced Power Operation not recommended 
As illustrated in chapter 4 (Figures 4 & 5), when the core is operated at reduced power for 
significant amounts of time, the clad may creep as a result of the differential pressure between 
RCS and the inside of the rod.  This will be a direct threat to core safety limits because it may 
cause the clad to come into contact with the fuel pellets and therefore result in fuel failures.  
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The rapid temperature increase (> 28 °C) observed with the power increase (Figure 4.3) is not 
acceptable because it indicates a rapid rise in fuel temperature. Such an operation would violate 
OTS and challenge the design basis of the plant. 
During the rapid power increase from low power operation, the temperature of the fuel will rise 
rapidly and the pellets will expand. Although the zirconium alloy cladding is selected because of 
its good ductility, the expansion of the pellet can result in pellet-clad interaction which stresses 
cladding causing the clad to crack or fail. Once the fuel expands and gets into contact with 
cladding they can react chemically and the chemical reaction produces a brittle layer that thins the 
cladding wall (Chichester, 2012). 
In order to ensure safe plant operation, Koeberg OTS imposes a limit of 3% per hour on the rate 
of power increase.  Therefore the current Koeberg units cannot be operated safely in load 
following mode, since the load ramps could be up to 5% per hour (depending on grid demand).  
5.4 Load Following should be considered for future NPPs in South Africa 
Considering the South African Government’s energy mix plan (IRP2010), to increase nuclear 
power input into the grid, NPP manoeuvring capabilities should be a mandatory requirement for 
the planned nuclear power plants. The future of electricity production in SA dictates that nuclear 
power plants should be capable of load following. This will require Gen III reactors. Therefore 
the manufacturers of major equipment like control rods, turbines, and steam governor valves will 
have to enhance the equipment design. More robust equipment, that would withstand the 
additional equipment stresses added by flexible load operation, would be necessary.  
Load following should be considered for the new plants in order to maintain grid stability. The 
current grid stability would be compromised by an addition of a big nuclear plant generating 
capacity without frequency control capability. This will make the grid more unstable. Since NPPs 
operate for a long time (about 60 years), smart grid combined with renewable energy input could 
change the current energy management solutions and it might then be mandatory for NPPs to load 
follow. For the envisaged South African energy mix, during low demand it would be cheaper to 
maintain NPPs at low power than to shut them down; 
• Fewer resources would be required compared to the case where the plant would be shut 
down.  




• Less borated water would be used and therefore reducing waste water production. 
For these reasons it will be advantageous for the future NPPs to be capable of load following. 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Work 
1. Impact cost analysis of Gen II NPP when considering life extension. This might 
negatively affect the Koeberg Operating Units considering that major equipment spares 
might be obsolete due to lack of demand or the power utility (Eskom) might have to bear 
storage costs. 
 
2. In order to understand the cost of cycling a 970 MW NPP, a study similar to the one done 
by Aptech Engineering in 1997 would have to be conducted with specific focus on South 
African conditions (NETL, 2012). 
 
3. Financial impact of modifying the Koeberg Gen II units for load following. Benefits of 
load following capability will have to be weighed against the costs of modifying the 
plant. 
 
4. A more in-depth study is necessary to fully understand how load following would impact; 
i. Plant reliability 
ii. Change in plant radiation  
iii. Nuclear waste production  
 
5. The change in Probabilistic Risk Assessment for postulated accident during load 
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